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Abstract The governance of patient safety is a challenging concern for all health systems.
Yet, while the role of executive boards receives increased scrutiny, the area
remains theoretically and methodologically underdeveloped. Speciﬁcally, we lack a
detailed understanding of the performative aspects at play: what board members
say and do to discharge their accountabilities for patient safety. This article draws
on qualitative data from overt non-participant observation of four NHS hospital
Foundation Trust boards in England. Applying a dramaturgical framework to
explore scripting, setting, staging and performance, we found important differences
between case study sites in the performative dimensions of processing and
interpretation of infection control data. We detail the practices associated with
these differences - the legitimation of current performance, the querying of data
classiﬁcation, and the naming and shaming of executives – to consider their
implications.
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Introduction
Patient safety remains a high-proﬁle health policy issue, traceable internationally since land-
mark publications in the USA (Institute of Medicine 1999) and UK (Department of Health
2000) highlighted the scale of medical error and harm to patients. Errors were framed as con-
ditioned, precipitated and exacerbated by systemic and latent organisational factors - and thus
amenable to prevention (Waring et al. 2010). Empirical research informed by organisational
psychology located clinical failures within organisational contexts (‘clinical micro-systems’),
seeing errors as the result of embedded unsafe practices rather than individual failings (Nelson
et al. 2008). The solution proposed for this framing of the problem was implementation of
standardised processes and ‘designing out’ errors, both at the level of speciﬁc interventions
and whole-organisation safety systems. While this perspective informs much empirical patient
safety research, Lamont and Waring (2015) offer a subtle reading of a tension evident within
the literature: is patient safety a ‘thing’ that may be enhanced through technical solutions; or a
more nebulous, contested phenomenon requiring attendance to the socio-cultural context of
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proposed changes to practice (Rowley and Waring 2011)? From a socio-cultural perspective,
transfer of technical ‘solutions’ between industries risks subversion by existing professional
hierarchies, as observed by Currie et al. (2009) in an evaluation of incident reporting tech-
niques developed in the aviation industry and subsequently implemented within a hospital.
Crucially, it is feared that embedded social and organisational practices which make technical
systems work within their original contexts may be overlooked (Macrae 2014); and that this
explains the limited impact of patient safety interventions (Sheldon et al. 2004). The implica-
tion is that greater attention is required to ambiguities at play, and greater insight into the lived
experience of patient safety work requires combination of theory with empirical data.
The failure of the Executive board to ensure safe clinical practice was implicated in events at
Mid Staffordshire NHS Trust in the UK (Francis 2013) where many patients received sub-stan-
dard care in a context of chaotic management systems. The detailed response to these events is
outlined in A promise to learn – a commitment to act (Department of Health 2013) which
informed development of a National Patient Safety Alert System, publication of ‘never events’
data, and a Patient Safety Collaboratives programme to support improvements. As entities with
statutory responsibilities for oversight, boards have ultimate responsibility for upholding the
quality and safety of care delivered within their organisation, and are charged with a fundamen-
tal role in the governance of patient safety through deﬁning and managing objectives, strategy,
priorities, culture and systems of organisational control (NHS Leadership Academy 2013).
Empirical literature identiﬁes governance practices as potentially important in safeguarding
patient safety, including routine feedback and monitoring of statistical data, strategic involve-
ment of clinicians in quality improvement, and attention to external governance systems (Jha
and Epstein 2010, Jiang et al. 2009, 2011, Vaughn et al. 2006). However, as with the broader
patient safety research literature above, considerable weaknesses in study design and theoreti-
cal orientation remain (Millar et al. 2013). While qualitative and case-study research is emerg-
ing (Baker et al. 2010, Ramsay et al. 2010), signiﬁcant gaps remain in our understanding of
the processes of organisation associated with board governance of patient safety in hospital
settings (Chambers and Cornforth 2012). Speciﬁcally, we lack detailed understanding of what
board members do, and the manner in which they do so, as they seek to discharge obligations
with regard to patient safety (Millar et al. 2013, Nicolini et al. 2011, Waring 2007). The con-
cept performativity may prove helpful in exploring board practices (Freeman and Peck 2007,
2010), the purpose of this article being to explore its application empirically.
Below, we introduce performativity and consider its inﬂuence within the study of organisa-
tional life; trace its foundations to the work of Austin (1962) and Goffman (1974); and note
its empirical application in the context of participatory governance (Hajer 2004). We then
employ Hajer’s framework of scripting, setting, staging and performance to hospital executive
board meetings, and explore implications for patient safety governance.
The foundations of performativity: Austin and Goffman
Austin (1962) coined the neologism ‘performativity’ to describe instances in which the utter-
ance of a phrase constitutes an action which changes reality rather than describes it; a simulta-
neous ‘saying’ and ‘doing’ which requires others to act in accordance with its implications.
Austin’s paradigmatic case is the phrase ‘I do’ when spoken within the context of a marriage
ceremony; a phrase requiring those exchanging vows to act, and be acted upon by others, as a
married couple from that point forward. Austin additionally stipulates that performative utter-
ances are meaningful actions that are neither true nor false but generative, that is, they create a
social reality.
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While Austin deﬁnes performativity, Goffman’s (1974) dramaturgy of social interactions
applies a theatrical metaphor to indirectly explore its operation, principally through framing.
For Goffman, the framing of the stage – the separation of front of stage, backstage and audi-
ence, and reciprocal acceptance of the roles of audience and players – shapes the performativ-
ity of utterances onstage. In an extension of earlier work on the presentation of self (Goffman
1959), Goffman notes that performativities are made possible through framing. Frames are
essentially classiﬁcation systems which actors use to order and make sense of diverse social
phenomena, so that the performative potential of an utterance depends upon the frames
available.
The rise of ‘performativity’
From its inception within linguistic philosophy (Austin 1962), the reach of performativity has
ballooned. Early areas of inﬂuence include theoretical development in the emergence of order
in complex interactive systems (Bateson 1972); the framing, staging and (re)creation of social
life (Goffman 1974); and the ‘language games’ structuring performative utterances (Lyotard
1979). Later applications include the constitution of gendered identity through interactions
(Butler 1993, 2010); the continuous (re)construction of society (Latour 1986, 1987); and the
effects of economic theory upon action (Callon 1998). Organisationally, performativity has
informed analysis of continuous change present in the enactment of organisational routines
(Feldman and Pentland 2003); the enactment of technology within social settings (Law and
Singleton 2000, Orlikowski and Scott 2008); the role of storytelling in coordinating within and
between organisations (Diedrich et al. 2011); and organisational change as active translation
rather than passive diffusion (Czarniawska and Sevon 1996).
The performativity of governance: Hajer
Informed by Goffman’s earlier work, Hajer (2005, Hajer and Versteeg 2005) provides a dra-
maturgical framework for analysing the performative dimensions of public governance through
consideration of the setting(s) in which deliberation takes place and the enactment of organisa-
tional frames, operationalised through consideration of the scripting, setting, staging and per-
formance of governance. Scripting refers to the determination of actors involved in the
decision-making forum. Consistent with the generative potential of performativity it considers
how participatory practices construct participants as either active or passive; collaborators or
protesters; competent or incompetent. In contrast, setting concerns the physical environment of
interaction, including artefacts (e.g. minutes of previous meetings) that participants bring to the
physical environment and which shape performance. Deliberate attempts to organise interaction
between participants is identiﬁed as staging. It is achieved by drawing on existing symbols,
the invention of new ones, and conventions governing distinctions between active players and
passive audiences; what might be termed ‘unwritten rules of engagement’. The ﬁnal category,
performance, concerns interactions which (re)construct knowledge / power relationships that
shape future interactions, providing opportunities for change over time.
If Goffman is correct that reality is mediated through the application of frames to make
sense of available information then all accounts of reality are shaped. The implication, in the
context of patient safety governance, is that the examination of safety could be framed in
many ways with radically different consequences for action. For example, in presenting data
that indicates a breach of an infection control performance target, is this: an instance of
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unreliable data requiring a defence of organisational practice? Or a worrying event requiring
detailed diagnostic work to uncover systemic problems and institute quality improvement
activity? Or an impossibly harsh target imposed by regulators requiring robust challenge? We
explore empirically the operation of such performativities in relation to the board governance
of patient safety, applying Hajer’s analytic framework to qualitative data collected through
overt non-participant observation at four case-study sites within the English NHS.
Methods
Design
The overall study design is a comparative case study across multiple (n = 4) study sites (Stake
1995). Each case had at its centre an acute Foundation Trust (FT) hospital – an independent
public beneﬁt organisation based on mutual traditions subject to independent external regulation
(NHS Leadership Academy 2013). Membership of FT management boards comprises a chair,
chief executive, executive directors and independent (non-executive) directors (NEDs) who are,
with the chair, in the majority. All board members bear responsibility, individually and collec-
tively, for performance and the quality of services (NHS Leadership Academy 2013).
Sample selection
Cases reﬂect the diversity of English NHS hospital FT trusts: a district general; a teaching hos-
pital with a global reputation for specialist services and innovation; a regional centre offering
specialist services; and a trust undertaking large-scale service redesign. Further speciﬁc details,
including cultural characteristics of board meetings, is provided in Table 1.
Cases were additionally selected on the basis of their performance trajectory over the last
three years on a range of safety and quality indicators selected from the Dr. Foster database
for 2011. Every year Dr. Foster publishes a Hospital Guide that uses publicly available statis-
tics to measure and assess what is happening in hospitals in England to increase transparency
in relation to variations in performance. The data focuses on indicators in three domains of
quality obtained from the available statistics, combined with information from self-reporting of
safety aspects from an annual questionnaire. We used these data to select two case study sites
indicated as getting worse (in the light of overall improvement of other hospitals) and two that
were improving. Trust sites have been anonymised by being renamed after Scottish islands;
the two improving trusts are Islay and Arran, the two getting worse Lewis and Skye.
Data collection and analysis
Acting in pairs, the authors undertook overt non-participant observation of four sequential
management board meetings at each case study site, totalling approximately 50 hours of obser-
vation. Of the major topic areas discussed, issues relating to service quality, patient safety, per-
formance measurement, and risk formed a substantial part of board meeting time at each site
(Table 2). The authors are all experienced social policy researchers with established interests
in the governance of health care quality, and data collection was designed to facilitate an anal-
ysis of Hajer’s analytic framework. Descriptive free-text ﬁeld notes were taken by observers at
each meeting, supplemented with documentary data including the agenda, supporting papers
and (retrospectively upon completion) minutes of each meeting. Data from ﬁeld notes were
compiled across multiple board meetings within each trust to detail board operations and iden-
tify the manner in which board governance of patient safety was enacted. We used the analytic
dimensions of scripting, setting, staging and performance identiﬁed by Hajer (2005) as a
deductive a priori template (code book) against which qualitative material were organised.
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Thematic analysis revealed patterns (similarities and differences) within the data, showing the
divergent dramaturgies at play within each speciﬁc site. While these enactments were found to
be stable across multiple meetings within sites, they proved substantially different between sites.
Findings
We ﬁrst outline the operation of the board at each site to retain the integrity of each organisa-
tional setting, then offer a comparative analysis of Hajer’s dramaturgical categories ‘scripting’,
Table 1 Summary of each case study site
Arran ‘World-class provider’,
 Global aspirations built on research & development
 Strategic focus; external horizon-scanning to secure compliance with policy directives
and safeguard the self-image of the trust as a pre-eminent provider.
 Strong ‘shaping’ steer by the CEO: low challenge by non-execs and a strong medical
executive team
 Needing to address emerging performance issues while minimising damage to its
‘world class’ self-image
Skye ‘Local service under pressure’
 District general hospital trust (3 sites)
 Rotating board membership for over 3 years.
 A myriad of problems
 Focus on internal problem solving, limited wider strategy
 High internal challenge by non-execs, a strong chair, technocratic CEO ﬁnding his feet
Lewis ‘Embattled regional powerhouse’
 A large teaching hospital
 Seen as the main regional provider
 Dominant CEO acting as a political antagonist; defending local interests from competing
regional and national forces
 Estate, ﬁnance, and legal disputes
Islay ‘Faith in quality improvement methodologies’
 A district general hospital trust
 An ‘intelligent’ board
– Reasoned and assured questioning by non-execs;
– CQI culture;
– Emphasis on patient experience
 Strategic focus
– reconﬁguration and integrated care strategies
– Clinical oversight
– divisions ‘invited’ to provide updates
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‘setting’ and ‘staging’ in sequence across sites, indicating the scope and scale of differences
between sites (table 3). We then explore the ﬁnal dramaturgical category, ‘performance’, in
relation to board deliberation of indicators associated with infection control, a key component
of the external performance management regime within the English NHS.
Site 1: Arran – a world-class provider
Arran has a strong research culture and global reputation for service innovation. The board
acts strategically and is externally oriented, seeking to secure compliance with central policy
directives while further developing its global reach and status as a pre-eminent provider and
academic research centre. In operation, board meetings are highly formal and structured to
enable the CEO to ‘steer’ interpretations of events. The executive team are experienced with
low turnover and a strong medical presence. Non-executives exhibit low levels of challenge
even when performance difﬁculties are under discussion; indeed, the dynamic of board meet-
ings could be summarised as maintenance of the narrative of ‘world class’ status while engag-
ing with potential performance difﬁculties evident in summary indicator data.
Site 2: Skye – a local service under pressure
In marked contrast, Skye exhibits high levels of executive turnover and overt recognition of
multiple problems in service provision, focusing on internal problems rather than strategy.
board meetings are steered strongly by the chair who dominated a newly appointed CEO;
strong challenges from Non-executives are common including expressions of disappointment
at poor service performance and support for executives considered high performing. During
the period of observation one executive stepped down, replaced by a deputy who received
similarly high levels of challenge. Board dynamics could be summarised as routine non-execu-
tive challenge with limited long-term strategic direction.
Site 3: Lewis – an embattled regional powerhouse
Protective of its reputation as a regional centre, board meetings are structured to ensure that
issues considered to be of strategic importance receive due consideration, events considered as
Table 2 Summary of board time by topic area across all four observed meetings
Topic areas
Arran Skye Lewis Islay
Mins (%) Mins (%) Mins (%) Mins (%)
Service quality,
patient safety, performance
measurement, risk
252 (60) 379 (42) 236 (28) 448 (54)
Strategy and capacity 30 (7) 185 (21) 158 (19) 315 (38)
HR 56 (13) 79 (9) 13 (2) 31 (4)
Finance 83 (20) 55 (6) 105 (12) 28 (3)
Estates – – – – 198 (23) 8 (1)
Other – – 194 (22) 130 (17) – –
Total 421 (100) 892 (100) 845 (100) 830 (100)
The table summarises the amount of time spent in minutes (percentage of total time) on speciﬁc, frequently occurring,
topic areas within each case study site, totalled across all of the four board meetings at each site. All board meetings
devoted considerable time to issues of service quality, patient safety, performance measurement and risk, and this com-
posite measure took the longest amount of time at each of the sites.
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they unfold over successive meetings. The image revealed is that of a guardian of local and
wider regional interests, requiring continued political inﬂuence. The executive team is experi-
enced and longstanding and the CEO personiﬁes the organisation, dominating board meetings
and acting as a political antagonist to defend local interests. During observation considerable
time was spent on a small number of ﬁnancial and estate issues and related legal disputes con-
sidered strategically important. Non-executives were typically involved in clariﬁcations related
to their speciﬁc areas of interest rather than challenges over strategy or performance. Overall,
the board dynamic could be characterised as one of defending ‘regional champion’ status.
Site 4: Islay – faith in quality improvement methodologies
The overwhelming impression of this site is one in which board structures and processes focus
attention on reconﬁguration and integrated care strategies. Central to this approach is the con-
sideration of performance issues related to external regulatory requirements (infection control;
pressure sores) directly linked to improvement work to support strategic plans. Patient experi-
ence is routinely invoked and normalised by the presentation of a patient experience narrative
at the start of each board meeting. Non-executives are encouraged to question and their contri-
butions are actively sought by the executive team. This board could be characterised as draw-
ing on a wide range of soft and hard intelligence, seeking to maintain strategic focus while
discharging external regulatory accountabilities.
A dramaturgy of board governance of patient safety
Scripting
While often commenting on information presented to the board, at Arran NEDs were limited
in their challenges to executives and avoided overt conﬂict. In marked contrast the chair and
non-executive directors at Skye conﬁdently challenged executives, particularly in relation to
poor performance in infection control and capacity issues, demanding that the CEO improve
standards. There was clear differentiation in the way that different executives were seen and
treated, being either lauded or shamed. The medical director (MD) was widely seen as compe-
tent and dependable, and his pathway development work was formally acknowledged:
Chair: Can we please congratulate [Chief Operating Ofﬁcer name] and [MD name]
they’re doing a great job.
NED: Yes, the Medical Director is bringing it down to local levels which is great to
see. . . (Field note extract)
In contrast, the Nurse Director received tougher questioning and her hesitancy was drawn to
attention (considered in detail below in the section on ‘performance’).
At Lewis, board meetings could be summarised as the ‘CEO show’; the dominant narrative
was of an embattled trust, ﬁghting for local interests – a trust under ﬁre enmeshed in struc-
tural, legal and ﬁnancial disputes. This strongly adversarial framing is typical and exempliﬁed
in the CEOs threat to resign in the face of ﬁerce opposition from external opponents:
CEO: It’s insulting quite frankly. We’re dealing with animals. . . I’m willing to
resign if this drags on and isn’t resolved. (Field note extract)
The CEO’s views were rarely challenged internally, with board members supporting his posi-
tion and accepting his performance as part of the ritual and crafted with humour, emotion, and
political point-scoring. The chair had a supportive presence, summarising issues as appropriate.
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At Islay the board maintained a clear focus on strategy and service improvement. The CEO
projected a calm inﬂuence; a moderniser with a similarly oriented executive team who had
received quality improvement training which clearly informed board practice. Robust yet
respectful challenge was normalised among non-executives, framed and legitimated as ‘im-
proving patient experience’. Board dynamics were driven by this central narrative, which
granted permission for depersonalised challenge, exempliﬁed in the following ﬁeld note extract
concerning theatre safety, in which improvement activity is explored dispassionately in relation
to standardisation and cultural change, rather than personal challenge:
NED: The human factors training is important but has the culture changed? I need to
push you that we want to take it forward.
ClinicalLead: We do adhere to the protocols but we constantly want to be individuals as well. . .
CEO: This is the most challenging area, it should be processed, your personal
leadership is needed. . . but there needs to be some kind of standardisation.
MD: [name] has been amending the checklist to accommodate different
interpretations. . .. If you go round now, as a result of these changes, you’ll
see the difference. . . The problem was the theatre culture; we need a change
of attitude related to infection control. The drive for quality and safety’s the
most important (Field note extract)
Setting I: physical
Arran board meetings were held within the education centre at Trust HQ in a large room with
high-quality presentation facilities. The location reinforced a sense of ‘information transmis-
sion’ (passive) rather than deliberation (active). The room was large, bright and airy, the audi-
ence typically consisting of ﬁve governors and / or members of the public, ordered into rows
of (sparsely populated) chairs facing presentation screens and set back from board members,
themselves seated in a ‘horseshoe’ arrangement of three tables at the front of the room; a non-
adversarial setting consistent with a ‘common purpose’.
Skye meetings were held at different locations across the trust. With one exception, meeting
rooms were cramped, hot, and lacking air circulation. Because of the poor conditions the audi-
ence (3–5 governors) tended to split into two groups at opposite sides of the room, very close
to the board table. The chair, chief Executive, trust secretary and trust minute-taker sat
together, with other seats haphazardly assigned with no consistency across meetings.
Board meetings at Lewis were held at the board room at the main trust site whose decor
consisted of dark wood tables and chairs with red leather covers; an imposing environment
reﬂecting civic pride. The seating arrangement was stable across meetings. The chair, chief
executive and observers sat together, the business development director and non-executives
together on an adjacent table and the nurse and ﬁnance director with some spaces for guest
speakers and observers. The trust secretary, medical director, and more non-executives sat at
an adjacent table. Those invited to present to the board faced an experience akin to an
inquiry; waiting in an anteroom for the appointed time on the agenda, invited in when
required, positioned on a table in front of the board to face questions, and escorted out once
their item concluded.
While the venue for Islay board meetings rotated, all were held in well-furnished, low-key
‘ofﬁce’ environments. Rooms were spacious and accommodated observers. Seating was
arranged around a large single table on an ad hoc basis. Attendees included members of the
quality improvement team, and clinical leads who attended to report updates regarding speciﬁc
clinical reviews.
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Setting II: artefacts
Board papers All sites provided a brieﬁng pack of information ahead of the meeting, consist-
ing of a formal, standardised agenda and appended reports for agenda items in sequence. The
format and contents were similar across sites. Two frames of reference underpinned board
papers: RAG (red-amber-green) ratings and ‘narrative’ executive summaries. Board papers pre-
sented information in the form of an executive summary of the ‘key issues’ over the past
month and the options for moving forward, and additional quantitative material included line
graphs, run charts and bar charts related to performance.
Presentations At Arran presentations were undertaken by medical staff in response to speci-
ﬁc issues highlighted within prior board meetings. The format broadly adhered to conven-
tions associated with academic medical lectures, presenters using available electronic
facilities to display detailed presentations, summarising the main points of associated reports
appended within the compendium of board papers, and responding to questions from the
ﬂoor. While affording Non-executive board members the opportunity to raise detailed
questions, presenters framed material to anticipate questions and structure the following
discussion.
While similar conventions operated at Skye presentations were more informal in tone,
lacked vibrancy and afforded Non-executive board members the opportunity to raise questions
in relation to detail.
Staging
Formal in operation, the ordering of the agenda at Arran facilitated the crafting of an over-
arching narrative by the CEO presenting the organisation as a high performer – even where
more detailed reporting suggested potential difﬁculties.
The detailed ‘performance report’ delivered by the director of strategy provided a high-level
summary and narrative overview of key performance indicator (KPI) data related to activity,
efﬁciency, access, cancer, infection, quality and safety, workforce, ﬁnance, and the monitor
compliance framework. Performance data were presented for the current month and year to
date summarised on a single A4 page, and disaggregated by sub-division (medicine, surgery
and cancer, specialist) with additional data in a supporting document. While the structure
(KPIs) and form (‘trafﬁc-light’ RAG indication of performance against targets) of reporting
used to inform the board potentially supported the adversarial discharge of public governance
in the form of assurance (‘conformance’), Non-executives did not use the data to publicly chal-
lenge executives at any of the observed board meetings.
The CEO avoided such overt challenges by contextualising shortfalls detailed in the perfor-
mance report in his preceding ‘CEO report’, offering an interpretation of ﬁgures and outlining
on-going work to diagnose and / or address shortfall. We consider this in further detail in the
‘performance’ section below. The CEO’s report was wide-ranging, provided opportunities for
clariﬁcation and discussion, and consequently took considerable time. The CEO used this com-
posite section, delivered very early in the board meeting, to consider multiple items related to
trust activity / performance and their implications, in the light of external policy directives and
/ or the strategic opportunities they provided.
In contrast to the close executive control above, at Skye the staging was typiﬁed by the
chair’s dominance. His steering of the agenda, and contributions from others, focused princi-
pally on the breach of targets (particularly C. difﬁcile (C. diff)) and issues related to coding
and validity of statistics, with very limited external horizon scanning or evidence of wider
strategy. The chair was active throughout, particularly so in relation to quality and patient
safety, evidenced in steering challenges to the nurse director about infection control and the
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failure to achieve the C. diff target. There was a sense (picked up by an audience member in
an aside to researchers) that he dominated the meeting. By controlling the staging and encour-
aging NED interjections the chair prevented other narratives from unfolding.
Staging at Lewis was shaped by an extensive ‘matters arising’ section placed immediately
after the opening item of ‘apologies’. This was by far the longest section and invariably con-
sisted of the following issues considered most important including a major capital investment
project; qualiﬁed provider procurements; an academic health science network; and commis-
sioner penalties in relation to C. difﬁcile.
In contrast, board meetings at Islay were tightly structured around the agenda. The tone of
each meeting was set by an opening ‘patient story’ narrative, introduced by the chair as
‘something to focus our minds’. These narratives, collected by the improvement team, con-
cerned issues such as the fears, anxieties and negative experiences following diagnosis, pro-
cesses of care and treatment outcomes. They were emotive and used by the chair to
legitimate challenge and concern with service improvement; the language of ‘patient experi-
ence’ was available to, and used by, board members to depersonalise challenging questions.
Strategic focus on service improvement was supported by the agenda structure, ‘service
improvement’ placed as a standing agenda item immediately after the ‘patient story’, and led
by members of the quality improvement team presenting data and updating progress on strate-
gically important projects including intensive care, community services, falls and infections.
The incorporation of indicators for infections into this section is important, as it ties external
regulatory requirements to internal strategy in an agenda item speciﬁcally oriented to service
improvement.
Performance(s): board governance of infection control
Board meetings at Arran were dominated by the CEO and typiﬁed by a need to present trust
performance in a favourable light, consistent with a ‘world-class’ reputation. This dominance
was not exercised through explicit force of personality, but principally through careful structur-
ing of the agenda and the use of framing in the ‘CEO Report’ agenda item to shape percep-
tions of, and thus actions in relation to, items appearing later in the agenda.
As outlined above, the CEO’s report drew attention to shortfalls in performance. Notable
examples in relation to patient safety included failure to achieve reduction in C. diff targets for
three quarters in succession, and a potential breach of A&E waiting time target in the fourth
quarter (and thus for the whole year). While both of these topics could have raised vociferous
challenges from non-executives, no such challenges were made. Rather, in relation to the for-
mer, the CEO announced that commissioners had waived penalties for eight cases, and on this
basis he had conferred with the external regulatory body for reclassiﬁcation as ‘green’
(healthy) under their governance performance indicator, previously ﬂagged as amber and plac-
ing the trust under external scrutiny. This was presented as evidence of over-sensitivity to bor-
derline non-compliance:
CEO: Monitor reports C. diff in A&E is now [six over target] but there are eight
cases that we have appealed. These shouldn’t have been in the ﬁgures in the
ﬁrst place; it should have been identiﬁed before coming in (. . .) we have
missed (the target) for three quarters (. . .) So the problems with A&E
combined with C. diff means our governance rating’s likely to go down the
fourth quarter. It means the organisation hasn’t deteriorated but it can give a
negative impression to the outside world. (Field note extract)
In the case of the A&E issue, the seriousness of the potential breach was minimised by
reference to the ubiquity of such problems (‘everyone faces such difﬁculties’), addressed with
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reference to current plans to expand A&E provision (‘we are already dealing with this’), and
attention focused on the role of limited out-of-hours cover by GPs in increasing demand on
A&E services (‘the problem lies elsewhere’).
In both instances, the CEO’s report identiﬁed poor performance against indicators that could
have been addressed as ‘breaches’, pre-interpreting the data as misleading. That these analyses
were convincing is clear from the fact that neither of these issues were picked up by non-exec-
utives for further exploration during the subsequent detailed performance report. Given the
important work involved in framing these issues the CEO report was typically one of the
longer, and on one occasion the longest, agenda item(s) at 46 minutes out of a total of 110
(42% of the total time).
In contrast, board performances at Skye were typiﬁed by high levels of NED activity. In
relation to breach of a C. diff target, the chair adopted a tone of disappointment at failure to
reach the target – presented as a serious issue which needed to be tackled, requiring explana-
tion by the director of nursing. There was no serious attempt to reframe the target breach; the
ND is held responsible:
Chair: We’ve not got continuous quality improvement for C. diff. This has increased
from last year which in my opinion is unacceptable. . . So, is the C-Diff policy
in place [name]?
ND: The policy and plan is good, but [she hesitates]
NED: I feel there was a struggle to answer, I’m disappointed with the reaction from
the new Nursing Director. (Field note extract)
Detailed discussion followed on the implications for the trust:
NED: What about costs?
FD: Seven over [and] it’s a £3.5 million ﬁne, so we need to talk to
Commissioners, plus the cost of additional cleaning.
NED: How likely will the surplus be wiped out?
FiD: CCG won’t want us bankrupt but there are higher powers than the CCG.
(Field note extract)
High levels of challenge were also evident in relation to other performance issues, including a
‘red’ rating against A&E performance and a lower than anticipated level of emergency admis-
sions.
At Lewis, CEO dominance and use of humour, emotion and politics is exempliﬁed in dis-
cussions of a breach of infection control targets. Discussion focused on the ﬁnancial penalties
associated with breach of the target, the trust facing a ﬁne of over £1 million per excess case.
Disputes with commissioners ensued and legal proceedings developed, board discussions
centred on ‘proportionality’ and perceived unfair treatment in comparison with regional
neighbours:
MD: There’s no drive for improvement. [local rival] has had the same target as last
year. Why have we been given such a challenging target? [Local rival] isn’t in
breach of contract even if they miss target! I mean we could use the money
and reinvest in community if we are in surplus. . .. I need a steer if we’re not
budging on £1.3 million then court mediation is the answer . . . It’s ridiculous,
it’s a disincentive to improve, make improvements. We’re also going to
discuss this with the FT network. The penalties are completely
disproportionate. . . .
Non-exec: Yeah, they’ve got the process wrong here.
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Chief executive: Yes, I know, I’ve heard [local rival #2] is at <70 more than trust>. We
accept <target> but it’s not proportionate. (Field note extract)
The CEO suggested they had no choice but to take commissioners to court as an act of safe-
guarding local services:
CEO: Someone has to stand up for the NHS and it’s going to be <Trust name>. We
are going to. . . .
NED: London will be imposing further penalties; I’m pretty sure of that based on
my intelligence working with London,
CEO: This isn’t about London, this is about the NHS. It’s about people delivering
the services, people receiving services. . . (Field note extract)
While board consideration of infection control at Islay was also framed in relation to external
targets, its service improvement orientation was very evident. The MD presented data showing
that the trust was meeting its target. This was warmly welcomed by a non-executive who
praised the effort, and then quickly considers the interventions required to ensure continuous
compliance, prompting a discussion of the educational interventions being made to embed
infection control in staff behaviour:
MD: We are under trajectory, we are making good progress. MRSA is an area of
anxiety. We had an outbreak on <ward name>, fogging, deep cleaning all as
you would expect. A root cause analysis of all cases couldn’t ﬁnd anything.
No cause found. It was just patient speciﬁc. For E-Coli . . . we are trying to
distinguish the ones that we can prevent and the ones that are unpreventable.
NED: These are fantastic results to be under the targets but work to be done to
assure and provide more details. We need to work within the Divisions with
the high turnover of junior doctors in order to educate them about infections;
otherwise it’s never going to end.
A&E consultant 1: It’s the ownership
Consultant 2: It’s getting permanent staff to communicate with junior doctors and it’s also
about getting Advanced Nurse Practitioners involved. (Field note extract)
These very different emphases and approaches across sites are summarised in Table 2.
Discussion
Obtaining, processing and interpreting performance information are acknowledged as impor-
tant aspects of boards’ oversight role (Department of Health 2013). While there is limited
empirical support internationally that those hospital boards which prioritise the collection and
analysis of performance data tend to have improved quality outcomes (Jiang et al. 2009), our
analysis draws attention to the mediating role played by processing and interpreting perfor-
mance data and to the performativities at play during deliberation. Consistent with a socio-cul-
tural perspective (Lamont and Waring 2015), performative analysis enables empirically
grounded exploration of the refraction of external requirements for patient safety governance
through local practices. Speciﬁcally, we highlighted the practices involved in realising the
potential of patient safety performance indicators (Freeman 2002), and more importantly how
the ‘warning signals’ provided by such data may be muted, deﬂected or silenced. We consider
further the implications of our analysis for recent international empirical research ﬁndings,
speciﬁcally time spent on patient safety; availability of patient safety indicators; and the
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training required by board members. While cautious of the reiﬁcation involved in lauding
speciﬁc interventions as ‘solutions’ to patient safety problems, we maintain that close analysis
of the understandings and conventions in board interactions may be helpful in informing
action.
A very high proportion of English NHS hospital Trust boards carry out processes that inter-
national research indicates may be associated with higher performance (Jha and Epstein 2013,
Mannion et al. 2015). All report quality sub-committees (Jha and Epstein 2010) and almost all
have explicit objectives related to improving patient safety (Jiang et al. 2008, 2009). All of
our case study sites sought to provide strategic assurance by establishing organisational struc-
tures and processes for reporting safety-related information throughout the organisation and to
the board (Botje et al. 2014, Jiang et al. 2009); making patient safety a strategic priority
(Jiang et al. 2008); developing and nurturing an ‘open and fair culture’ (Vaughn et al. 2006);
and using high level information to ensure compliance with safe practices / standards and
external targets (Jha and Epstein 2010). Yet, the degree to which aspirations were fully met
was moot, and governance activities remain contingent on board dynamics. Our case study
sites exhibited governance behaviours variously related to: agency theory (Chambers and
Cornforth 2010), in seeking to measure performance to ensure compliance and hold staff
accountable for their actions; stewardship theory (Cornforth and Edwards 1998), in attempting
to implement a framework of shared values built on trust; stakeholder theory (Chambers and
Cornforth 2010), in managing complex trade-offs between stakeholders, including staff,
patients and the public; and resource dependency theory (Zahra and Pearce 1989) in managing
internal and external relationships to leverage inﬂuence.
Our analysis highlights the role of, and differences in, local processes of organising in rela-
tion to board governance of patient safety. Thus while the amount of board time devoted to
discussing patient safety has been identiﬁed as potentially important (Jha and Epstein 2010),
we draw attention to the fact that boards used this time differently. Similarly, while the avail-
ability of summary data has been indicated as important (Jiang et al. 2008, 2009), and similar
levels of performance indicator data relating to infection control were available at each of our
case study sites, differences in use were signiﬁcant and related to the practices legitimated
within each setting. At Skye, Arran and Lewis attention focused on data indicating shortfalls –
a quality assurance oriented approach. Operationalising the governance of patient safety largely
in terms of assurance through retrospective use of performance data to alert the board of poor
performance encourages under-reporting and does not indicate how to address deﬁciencies.
Speciﬁc responses noted at our sites included challenge and blame by NEDs at Skye; interpre-
tive work by the CEO to forestall challenge at Arran; and framing targets as unrealistic and
requiring challenge of regulators at Lewis.
Our results also have implications for the nature of training required by boards. Findings high-
lighted the challenges board members face in terms of scripting and staging, especially when
decisions in these areas often pass unchallenged, unremarked or even unnoticed. A better under-
standing of these issues may feed into revised training and induction processes for board mem-
bers. In the USA, a number of states have introduced initiatives in the form of mandatory
induction and orientation programmes for board members (Jha and Epstein 2012) and this may
also be an area that requires greater attention in the UK. Crucially, while the availability of infor-
mation may be a necessary precursor for improvement, it is not of itself sufﬁcient. While devel-
opment of technical ‘competencies’ in analysis of performance indicators may be helpful, the
important role played in setting, scripting and staging in the use and interpretation of information
and performance data suggests that a broader curriculum is required directly attending to these
issues. While summary reporting of quality indicators is important (Jha and Epstein 2010), local
processes of organising that make it possible for non-executive board members to use such infor-
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mation to hold executives to account sensitively are required – most evident at Islay and rather
less so elsewhere. Thus the dramaturgical arrangements of boards require attention if they are to
become fora for effective debate, challenge and the instigation of action.
Only at Islay did the board seek to provide a strategic focus on quality improvement (to the
extent of structuring the board agenda around strategic quality improvement initiatives). This
approach seemingly offers a way of managing tensions between assurance and improvement
by combining the requirements of external assurance with ongoing quality improvement
through development of national and local level datasets, and required additional qualitative
information from reports by teams from clinical service areas.
It is important to note that we do not claim privileged status for our own analysis, or sug-
gest that our perspective somehow reﬂects an underlying ‘truth’ to which we had special
access. We do not claim that the performance indicator data presented at these board meetings
showed deﬁciencies in patient safety that were inappropriately interpreted away. Indeed, the
very value of a performative approach is that it traces the way in which words both ‘say’ and
‘do’; to consider meaningful actions that are neither true nor false but create a social reality
acted upon by others. Our analysis shows the use of data to create a social reality in relation
to infection control rates, which then guided future actions. We would assert however that a
set of behaviours / practices that use information to support cycles of improvement activity are
required.
Conclusions
Studies of statistical associations between organisational structures and patient safety outcomes
are not able to explore the dynamic and messy lived reality of board governance practices
related to patient safety (Millar et al. 2013). Our analysis of such practices at four Hospital
boards indicates the importance of local processes of organising in relation to governance of
patient safety. While the availability of summaries of quality indicators to board members is
undoubtedly important, so equally are the operation of processes of organising that make it
possible for local actors to use such information to make interventions to sensitively hold
executives to account with regard to patient safety processes and outcomes. In this regard, our
ﬁndings indicate the challenges faced by board members in terms of the artefacts at their dis-
posal and the limitations of the scripts and staging associated with board practices. Encourag-
ingly, in drawing attention to practices associated with the enactment of safety and quality
they also indicate possibilities and opportunities for enhanced deliberation of information with
which to improve the corporate governance of safety and quality, and we encourage additional
applications of performativity-based approaches.
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